How to Claim a Gene: Application of the Patent Disclosure Requirements to Genetic Sequences by Giles, Patrick Brian
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 3 Spring 2011 Article 6
3-1-2011
How to Claim a Gene: Application of the Patent
Disclosure Requirements to Genetic Sequences
Patrick Brian Giles
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation





HOW TO CLAIM A GENE: APPLICATION OF THE 
PATENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS TO 
GENETIC SEQUENCES 
Patrick Brian Giles* 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1980, the only source of insulin for diabetics was the 
pancreas of animals, such as cows or pigs.1 While supply was not a 
problem, this source did carry the risk of infection and allergic 
reaction.2 Other therapeutic proteins, such as growth hormone, were 
previously only available in minuscule amounts from the pituitary 
glands of human cadavers.3 However, by 1980 the emerging field of 
biotechnology provided methods for producing mass quantities of 
human proteins such as insulin and growth hormone using the science 
of genetic engineering.4 These laboratory methods generally involve 
inserting a gene5 that encodes the desired therapeutic protein into a 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) vector.6 The product of this “DNA 
recombination” is then introduced to appropriate cells, the cells are 
cultured in the laboratory, during which time the cells produce the 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law; Ph.D.; registered patent agent. 
 1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Tests Begin on 
Insulin Synthesized from Bacteria Through Gene-Splicing, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1980, at D18; Cristine 
Russell, FDA Approves Insulin Made by Splicing Genes, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1982, at A6. 
 2. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562; Tests Begin on Insulin Synthesized from Bacteria Through Gene-
Splicing, supra note 1, at D18; Russell, supra note 1, at A6. 
 3. See, e.g., Sandra Blakeslee, Supply of Growth Hormone Brings Hope for New Uses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 1987, at C1. 
 4. See supra notes 1–3; CYNTHIA ROBBINS-ROTH, FROM ALCHEMY TO IPO 11 (Perseus Publishing 
2000). 
 5. Gregor Mendel was the first to appreciate that certain traits, such as flower color, do not blend in 
offspring, but are instead inherited based on the passage of a discrete factor, later termed a “gene,” to the 
offspring from both the mother and the father. It is now known that these genes are discrete segments of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which contain instructions for producing functional units, such as 
proteins. See generally Mark B. Gerstein et al., What is a Gene, Post-ENCODE? History and Updated 
Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 669–81 (2007). 
 6. See HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 176–98 (6th ed. 2008), for a 
description of many of the principles involved in molecular biology and recombinant DNA technology.   
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recombinant protein along side their natural proteins, and the 
recombinant protein is then collected and purified.7  
Not surprisingly, biotechnology companies have sought patent 
protection for these novel genes and their uses.8 Of course, these 
efforts are futile if a competitor can circumvent the patent by making 
changes to the claimed DNA sequence while preserving, or possibly 
improving, the therapeutic efficacy of the encoded protein.9 In fact, a 
competitor can routinely engineer non-naturally occurring variants 
using one of many recombinant techniques.10 Notably, in some cases, 
50% or more of the amino acid positions within the sequence of a 
protein can be substituted without substantially altering protein 
function.11 Inventors of novel genes and recombinant technologies, 
therefore, have sought patent protection beyond the scope of the 
specific genetic sequence they exemplified.12 While this can be done 
by specifically reciting each and every possible alternative sequence, 
to do so would be impractical.13 Instead, it is far more feasible to 
refer to the gene generically (e.g., by name or function), thereby 
describing a genus of genetic sequences covered by the claim.14 The 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. at 194–96. 
 8. Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us About the Role 
of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 215, 221–22 (2009) 
[hereinafter Holman, Learning from Litigation] (noting the early “belief that patent protection could 
prove critical in providing the necessary incentive for the development of drugs based on newly 
identified human genes”). 
 9. Id. at 226–27 (“[A] form of human insulin with a single amino acid change . . . renders the 
product faster acting than native insulin.”). 
 10. Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified Version of the BLAST Score as a 
Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of Related Protein Sequences, 21 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 60 (2004) [hereinafter Holman, Protein Similarity Score] 
(noting that it is routine to make mutations in a protein and screen those mutants for one that retains the 
desired function). 
 11. Id. at 59. 
 12. Id. at 57. 
 13. A protein is a polymer of amino acids linked together in a chain. See id. at 72 n.70. There are 
twenty different amino acids to choose from for each position in that chain. Id. Thus, for a typical 
protein having three hundred amino acids residues, there are nineteen alternative amino acids at each of 
the three hundred positions. Id. Using the equation ((19 x 300) + (19 x 300)(19 x 299)), this results in 
over thirty-two million possible protein variants that have a single amino acid change. See id. 
 14. When an aspect of an invention includes one of multiple alternative embodiments, a generic term 
may be used to represent each of those alternatives. ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF 
PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 6:9 (6th ed. 2008). For example, the term “mammal” represents a genus 
encompassing the species mice and humans. See id. Note that the genus can also cover a subgenus. Id. 
For example, “rodents” is a genus covering mice and rats, but it is also a sub-genus of mammals. See id.  
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problem, however, is that an overreaching genus claim may not 
satisfy the patent disclosure requirements codified in the first 
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112,15 which (according to the most current 
interpretation of the statute)16 requires that the disclosure (1) contain 
an adequate written description of the invention; (2) enable one to 
make and use the invention; and (3) disclose the inventor’s best mode 
for carrying out his invention.17 
Prior to 1997, the courts relied primarily on the enablement 
requirement to invalidate overreaching claims.18 However, in Regents 
of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,19 a court, for the 
first time, invalidated an original—arguably overreaching—claim for 
lack of written description.20 Specifically, the Lilly court concluded 
that the patentee’s description of the rat insulin DNA sequence was 
not a sufficient disclosure to support claims to vertebrate, 
mammalian, or human insulin DNA.21 As a consequence, inventors 
have had to find other ways to describe and claim genetic sequences 
in a manner that would cover predictable variants while at the same 
time not running afoul of the Lilly written description requirement.  
                                                                                                                 
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.”). 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 17. Under § 112, first paragraph, as enacted as part of the Patent Act of 1952, the inventor must 
adequately set forth and describe three items: (1) the invention (the description requirement); (2) the 
manner and process of making and using the invention (the enablement requirement); and (3) the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (the best mode requirement). 3 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2010). 
 18. E.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (arguing that an inventor should be 
allowed to dominate future patentable inventions based on his teachings so long as the scope of the 
claims “bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification”); see 
also Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment 
of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 12 
(2007) [hereinafter Holman, Paper Tiger] (noting that prior to Lilly, the enablement requirement was 
sufficiently robust to limit patent claims “to a scope commensurate with the inventor’s disclosure”).  
 19. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 20. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 4. 
 21. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568. 
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One approach taken by inventors,22 and originally endorsed by the 
Patent Office,23 was the claiming a genus of genetic sequences based 
on percent identity24 to a reference sequence—generally the naturally 
occurring gene—that is limited by a functional limitation.25 However, 
the Patent Office has recently reversed its position26 and proposed 
that inclusion of a functional limitation, which narrows the genus of 
genetic sequences to those that produce a functional protein (e.g., 
“wherein the polypeptide has activity X”), actually increases the 
burden on the specification to satisfy the written description 
requirement by disclosing a correlation between structure and 
function.27 This reversal in the application of the written description 
                                                                                                                 
 22. According to a search of the USTPO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, forty-one U.S. 
patents filed prior to 2000 and fifty-six U.S. patents filed between the years 2000 and 2007 were issued 
with the phrases “percent identity” and “SEQ ID NO” in the claims. USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image 
Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html. 
 23. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REVISED INTERIM WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS, 53–55 (1999), http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20070101024139/http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/writtendesc.pdf [hereinafter INTERIM 
TRAINING MATERIALS] (superseded). Example 14 of the Interim Training Materials suggested that a 
description of a protein isolated from liver having the sequence SEQ ID NO: 3 and shown to catalyze 
the reaction of A to B without exemplification of any variants with this activity nonetheless would 
satisfy the written description requirement for a claim reciting “[a] protein having SEQ ID NO: 3 and 
variants thereof that are at least 95% identical to SEQ ID NO: 3 and catalyze the reaction of A [to] B.” 
Id. at 53–55. 
 24. Percent sequence identity refers to the percentage of nucleic acid or amino acid residues within a 
given DNA or protein, respectively, that are identical to the reference sequence. See Holman, Protein 
Similarity Score, supra note 10, at 69. For example, a protein is essentially a biopolymer composed of 
amino acids in a specific order. Id. at 58–59. Thus, for a protein that is one hundred amino acids in 
length, one can substitute amino acids at five of the positions and still be at least 95% identical to the 
natural protein. See id. at 69–73. Moreover, there are twenty different amino acids in humans, so each 
position on the protein chain can be substituted with one of nineteen different amino acids. Id. at 59. 
These include conservative and non-conservative substitutions, which are not reflected in the percent 
identity. See id. at 73.  
 25. A functional limitation limits the claimed genetic sequences to those that are able to perform a 
recited function, thereby excluding from the claim non-functional variants that would fail to satisfy the 
utility requirement. See id. at 70, 82. 
 26. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
TRAINING MATERIALS, 37–39 (2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf [hereinafter 
REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS]. Dr. George Elliott, director of Technology Center 1600 responsible 
for examination of patent applications in the biotechnology and organic fields, acknowledged that the 
revision represented a reversal in the Office’s position. Donald Zuhn, Kubin, Panel Questions 
Motivation Behind Reversal in New Written Description Training Materials, PATENT DOCS, Jan. 8, 
2009, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/01/kubin-panel-questions-motivation-behind-reversal-in-new-
written-description-training-materials.html.  
 27. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 37–39 (“[I]n this example there is no general 
knowledge in the art about activity X to suggest that general similarity of structure confers the activity. 
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requirement has been upheld by the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (Board).28 However, the issue has not been considered 
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). 
Notably, the Federal Circuit recently upheld a rejection by the 
Board for a percent identity claim to a genus of nucleic acid 
molecules encoding the protein Natural Killer Cell Activation 
Inducing Ligand (NAIL) wherein the protein binds CD48.29 The 
Board had affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of the claim as both 
obvious and lacking written description in the specification.30 
However, the Federal Circuit chose to affirm the decision of the 
Board based solely on the obviousness rejection31 and therefore did 
not address the sufficiency of the disclosure under the written 
description requirement.32  
This Note examines application of the Patent Act disclosure 
requirements to percent identity claims. Part I of this Note reviews 
and discusses the development of the disclosure requirements and 
their application to genetic sequences.33 Part II of this Note analyzes 
the application of these disclosure requirements to percent identity 
claims.34 This analysis first evaluates the severability of the written 
                                                                                                                 
Accordingly, one of skills in the art would not accept the disclosure of SEQ ID NO: 2 as representative 
of other proteins having activity X.”). 
 28. The Board reviews ex parte appeals from adverse decisions of examiners. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) 
(2008). Prior to 2006, the Board had not upheld any rejections of percent identity claims based on a 
failure to satisfy the written description requirement. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 45, 83.  
 29. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 30. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416–17 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 31. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1361. While sidestepping the written description issue, the court 
nevertheless sent shockwaves with its decision. The Kubin court concluded that the Supreme Court had 
essentially overturned the obviousness standard set forth in In re Deuel, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1216 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1358. The Deuel court had determined that a protein does not 
always render the DNA encoding that protein obvious, even if it was obvious to try. Deuel, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1216. The Kubin court held that the ruling in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 
U.S. 398 (2007), “cast doubt on the viability of Deuel” and subsequently found that claims to the cDNA 
encoding NAIL were obvious since the prior art disclosed the existence of the protein. In re Kubin, 561 
F.3d at 1358, 1361. 
 32. This silence despite evident interest at oral argument could be considered sub silentio approval of 
the written description rejection and the approach taken in the Revised Training Materials. Kevin E. 
Noonan, Gene Patenting and the Wisdom of Judge Lourie, PATENT DOCS, Apr. l2, 2009, 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/04/gene-patenting-and-the-wisdom-of-judge-lourie.html; see also 
Zuhn, supra note 26. 
 33. See discussion infra Part I. 
 34. See discussion infra Part II. 
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description and enablement requirements35 and then explores the 
effect of omitting the functional limitation in sequence identity 
claims on the enablement requirement.36 Part III of this Note argues 
that identifying genetic sequences by percent identity without a 
functional limitation is adequate disclosure of the genus.37 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must file with her 
application a specification that fully discloses the invention to assure 
that the public receives a quid pro quo in exchange for the limited 
monopoly the patent grants to the inventor.38 This disclosure 
requirement of the Patent Act of 1952 is codified in the first 
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112,39 which, according to current 
interpretation of the statute,40 requires that the disclosure (1) contain 
an adequate written description of the invention; (2) enable one to 
make and use the invention; and (3) disclose the inventor’s best mode 
of carrying out the invention.41 The Patent Office and courts are using 
the first two disclosure requirements—written description and 
enablement—to prevent overreaching by inventors beyond the quid 
pro quo the public receives for granting the limited monopoly.42 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 37. See discussion infra Part III and Conclusion. 
 38. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[D]escription [of 
the invention] is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful disclosure in 
exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”); 3 CHISUM, 
supra note 17, § 7.01. 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.”). 
 40. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 41. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 7.01 (“Under Section 112, . . . the inventor must adequately set forth 
and describe three items: (1) the invention (the description requirement); (2) the manner and process of 
making and using the invention (the enablement requirement); and (3) the best mode contemplated by 
the inventor of carrying out his invention . . . .”). 
 42. Id. 
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A.  Written Description Requirement 
The written description requirement first appeared in the Patent 
Act of 1793.43 At that time, patents did not contain claims, so the 
written description served to both enable the invention and provide 
notice to the public of what the inventor was claiming as his 
invention.44 This notice function of the written description 
requirement put the public “in possession” of the scope of the 
claimed invention.45 However, with the Patent Act of 1870, this 
notice function was achieved by the claims instead of the 
specification.46 Thus, with the advent of claims, the “written 
description” language of the Patent Act was presumed for many 
decades to constitute superfluous words not distinct from the 
enablement requirement.47  
The written description requirement was reborn in 1967 with the In 
re Ruschig decision.48 The applicants in Ruschig attempted to add a 
new claim that was not fully supported by the specification to their 
application a year after it had been filed.49 Rather than reject the 
claims as new matter under § 132 of the Patent Act,50 however, the 
court “calved a new [written description] doctrine out of the § 112 
enablement requirement.”51 The court later distinguished these two 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836) (“[E]very inventor, before he 
can receive a patent, . . . shall deliver a written description of his invention . . . in such full, clear, and 
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known . . . .”). 
 44. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(citing Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822)); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of 
the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 
619–20 (1998). 
 45. Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977; Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 434; Mueller, supra note 44, at 620. 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”); 
see also Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977; 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 8.01; Mueller, supra note 44, at 620. 
 47. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (finding only two requirements in 
§ 112: enablement and best mode); see also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 594 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Rich, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the words “written description” were “of ancient lineage and, in spite of the 
fact they are inappropriate to some situations, they were preserved, in writing the Patent Act of 1952, 
because they were familiar and had many times been construed”); Mueller, supra note 44, at 620. 
 48. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 49. Id. at 991. 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the 
invention.”). 
 51. Enzo, 323 F.3d at 978. 
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sections as distinct and not interchangeable.52 Even so, the policy of 
this new written description requirement appeared to prevent 
inventors from later claiming more than they had invented at the time 
the application was filed.53 The Federal Circuit followed this 
precedent and applied the judicially created written description 
requirement strictly to later filed or amended claims that sought the 
benefit of the priority date of an earlier filed specification.54  
In 1997, however, the court in Lilly applied the written description 
requirement for the first time to original claims without any priority 
question.55 The patents at issue in Lilly were based on the cloning of 
the insulin gene, which, as discussed above, was a breakthrough that 
opened the way to modern methods of insulin production.56 
Nevertheless, while the claims in Lilly recited vertebrate, 
mammalian, and human insulin cDNA,57 only rat insulin cDNA was 
                                                                                                                 
 52. In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (arguing that § 132 “prohibits the 
introduction of new matter into the disclosure of an application,” while § 112, “[the] first paragraph, 
requires that claim language be supported in the specification”). 
 53. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he § 112 doctrine, like its corollary § 132, policed priority, 
nothing more.”); Mueller, supra note 44, at 621. 
 54. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Adequate description of 
the invention guards against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in 
such detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.” 
(quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))); In re Wright, 866 F.2d 
422, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[The] essence of the so-called ‘description requirement’ of § 112, first 
paragraph” involves inquiring whether “newly claimed subject matter was described in the patent 
application when filed.”). 
 55. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also 
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 979–80 (arguing that the court for the first time applied the written description 
requirement “as a general disclosure doctrine in place of enablement, rather than as a priority doctrine”); 
Mueller, supra note 44, at 633 (noting that Lilly was a departure from prior written description cases 
because the court applied the requirement to original claims rather than to claims presented or amended 
after the application filing date, and the court set a significantly higher standard for biotechnology 
inventions by requiring an express disclosure in the specification of the nucleic acid sequence for DNA 
claims).  
 56. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562; see also supra note 2. 
 57. Cells use the DNA sequence of a gene as a template to produce (transcribe) messenger 
ribonucleic acid (mRNA), which is complementary to the DNA sequence from which it is transcribed. 
HARVEY F. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 120–22 (6th ed. 2008). Cells may then use the 
mRNA produced to synthesize a protein encoded by the mRNA sequence. Id. However, unlike DNA, 
RNA is unstable. AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR BIOTECHNOLOGY 305–06 (Michael Wink ed., 
2006). Thus, scientists use the viral enzyme reverse transcriptase to do the reverse process—that is to 
produce a DNA complement from the mRNA. Id. This DNA is referred to as complementary DNA 
(cDNA). Id.  
8
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exemplified in the specification.58 While the court conceded that the 
specification provided a process for obtaining the human insulin-
encoding cDNA,59 it nevertheless concluded that the specification did 
not provide a written description of human, mammalian, or vertebrate 
insulin cDNA.60 The court opined that “a method of preparing a 
cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA encodes, as the 
example does, does not necessarily describe the cDNA itself.” 61 The 
court likewise determined that “a description of rat insulin cDNA is 
not a description of the broad classes of vertebrate or mammalian 
insulin cDNA.”62 While this case has been heavily criticized as 
creating an unprecedented “super-enablement” requirement for DNA-
based inventions,63 the court was in fact building on past precedent 
indicating a reluctance to grant broad protection to biotechnology 
inventions absent structural descriptions. 
For example, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., the 
patent at issue recited claims to a DNA sequence encoding human 
erythropoietin (EPO).64 It was conceded that Amgen was the first 
company to isolate the EPO gene and produce recombinant EPO for 
therapeutic use.65 The defendants asserted, however, that Amgen’s 
claims were invalid under § 102(g)66 based on prior invention by one 
of their scientists who was allegedly first to conceive the strategy for 
isolating the EPO gene.67 In response, the court opined that invention 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562. 
 59. Id. at 1567. 
 60. Id. (arguing that the specification provided “only a general method for obtaining the human 
cDNA” based on the amino acid sequences of human insulin A and B and the method used to obtain the 
rat cDNA; it thus did not provide a description of the cDNA encoding human insulin, whether or not the 
disclosure was enabling). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1568. 
 63. E.g., Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 4; Mueller, supra note 44, at 633. 
 64. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Erythropoietin 
protein stimulates the production of red blood cells and is therefore a “useful therapeutic agent in the 
treatment of anemias or blood disorders characterized by low or defective bone marrow production of 
red blood cells.” Id. at 1203. 
 65. Edmund L. Andrews, Ruling May Hurt Amgen’s Rights to Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at 
D1. 
 66. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . before such person’s 
invention thereof, the invention was made . . . by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or 
concealed it.”). 
 67. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205. 
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of a gene occurs when it is actually isolated in cases where “an 
inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as 
to distinguish it from other materials.”68 
Likewise, in Fiers v. Revel, the court went on to hold that “[a]n 
adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a mere 
statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential 
method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA 
itself.”69 The Lilly court relied on the Fiers holding to find that 
written description of a genus of genetic sequences can be achieved 
by “recitation of a representative number of [sequences] within the 
scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to 
the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial 
portion of the genus.”70 The court later confirmed that these rules 
apply “[r]egardless [of] whether a compound is claimed per se or a 
method is claimed that entails the use of the compound.”71 
The court has, however, made some concessions to the Lilly 
written description requirement. On rehearing, the court in Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. reversed its prior decision and held 
that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository 
constitutes adequate written description of the deposited material.72 
Moreover, the Enzo court clarified that functional limitations can 
satisfy the written description requirement if they are “coupled with a 
known or disclosed correlation between function and structure.”73 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 1206 (“Conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the structure of the 
chemical, or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or 
whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal 
biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin, because an alleged conception having no more 
specificity than that is simply a wish to know the identity of any material with that biological 
property.”). 
 69. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court further clarified the holding in 
Amgen, finding that “conception only of a process for making a substance, without conception of a 
structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute a conception of the substance 
claimed as a process.” Id. at 1169. 
 70. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 71. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 72. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (arguing that deposit 
makes the contents of nucleotide sequence accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in 
written form). 
 73. Id. at 964 (adopting the standard described in the Written Description Guidelines for showing 
that an invention is complete). 
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The court has further held that adequate written description can occur 
absent working examples or actual reduction to practice.74 Likewise, 
the written description requirement does not require recitation of 
known structures or sequences.75  
With these guideposts in mind, the Board recently chose to uphold 
a rejection of a percent identity claim containing a functional 
limitation as lacking sufficient written description, even though the 
skilled artisan76 admittedly could have made and used the full scope 
of the claim through routine experimentation.77 Citing Enzo, the 
Board opined that the specification may have met the written 
description requirement if the functional limitation—binding to 
CD48—had been coupled with a disclosed or known correlation 
between the function and structure.78 Interestingly, even though the 
genus of nucleic acids was primarily defined structurally based on 
sequence identity, the Board nevertheless argued that “[w]ithout a 
correlation between structure and function, the claim does little more 
than define the claimed invention by function.”79 
The Patent Office’s position in the Training Materials suggests 
that a valid percent identity claim becomes invalid when further 
limited in scope to a subgenus of genetic sequences having a 
particular function.80 Nevertheless, the Patent Office alluded in the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 75. Id. at 1366–67. “Lilly does not set forth a per se rule that whenever a claim limitation is directed 
to a macromolecular sequence, the specification must always recite the gene or sequence, regardless of 
whether it is known in the prior art.” Id. at 1367; see also Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (holding that prior cases do not require a re-description of what is already known). 
 76. The “person skilled in the art” referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a legal fiction—similar to the 
“reasonable person” found in the common law of torts—representing a hypothetical person having 
knowledge in the particular technical field (art) without being a genius. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, 
§ 8.03(3); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.03 (8th ed., rev. 8 July 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm. 
 77. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416–17 (B.P.A.I. 2007) (“[An] invention may be enabled 
even though it is not described.” (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921 
(Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
 78. Id. at 1417. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Compare Claim 1 with Claim 2 in Example 11A of REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 
26, at 37–39.  
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Training Materials to the possibility that percent identity claims could 
also raise enablement issues.81 
B.  Enablement Requirement 
To be patentable, “the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable 
correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification 
to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”82 In order for a patent 
specification to enable a claimed invention, one skilled in the art must 
be able to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention based 
on the disclosures in the specification, coupled with information 
known in the art, without undue experimentation.83  
Whether undue experimentation is needed to practice the claimed 
invention is not determined by analyzing a single factor, but rather by 
weighing many factual considerations.84 For example, although the 
quantity of experimentation necessary is a factor to be considered by 
the court,85 it is not dispositive “since a considerable amount of 
experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine.”86 Similarly, 
the patent specification can omit what is well known in the art87 even 
though the amount of direction or guidance presented is an important 
                                                                                                                 
 81. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 41.  
 82. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Fisher, 427 
F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 83. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed Cir. 1986); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“That some experimentation is necessary does not preclude enablement; 
the amount of experimentation, however, must not be unduly extensive.”). 
 84. The Wands court set forth the following factors for consideration: “(1) the quantity of 
experimentation necessary [i.e., time and expense], (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, 
(3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the 
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and 
(8) the breadth of the claims.” Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (citing Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 
(B.P.A.I. 1986)). However, it is not necessary that every enablement analysis consider all of these 
factors. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213. 
 85. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212. 
 86. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (B.P.A.I. 1982)). 
 87. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1384 (“[A] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well 
known in the art.”); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 
1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The question is whether the disclosure is sufficient to enable those skilled in the 
art to practice the claimed invention, hence the specification need not disclose what is well known in the 
art.”). 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/6
2011] HOW TO CLAIM A GENE  
 
707
consideration.88 Moreover, whereas the presence or absence of 
working examples is relevant to an enablement inquiry,89 the 
specification does not have to include actual embodiments or 
examples to be enabling.90  
A claim can be rejected, however, under the “how-to-use” aspect 
of the enablement requirement if it is so broad as to cover inoperative 
embodiments.91 While a claim does not have to specifically exclude 
all possible inoperative embodiments to be enabled,92 the claim may 
be invalid if the number of inoperative embodiments forces the 
skilled artisan to use undue experimentation to identify those 
embodiments that are functional and covered by the claim in order to 
practice the invention.93 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Separating the Written Description and Enablement Requirements 
1.  Are the Written Description and Enablement Requirements 
Severable? 
While there is some argument whether the court in Ruschig in fact 
discerned a separate written description requirement severable from 
the enablement requirement,94 a panel of the Federal Circuit in Vas-
                                                                                                                 
 88. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
 89. Id. 
 90. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Nothing more than objective enablement is 
required, and therefore it is irrelevant whether this teaching is provided through broad terminology or 
illustrative examples.”). 
 91. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 7.03(7)(c). As part of the quid pro quo in the form of an enabling 
disclosure, “an applicant must provide sufficient assurance that at least substantially all of the 
compounds within a generic claim are useful.” Id. (citing In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357 (C.C.P.A. 
1960)). 
 92. In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (arguing that there is nothing wrong with claims 
reading on vast numbers of inoperative embodiments so long as the skilled artisan could determine 
utility without unreasonable effort). 
 93. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“Of course, if the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one of 
ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might 
indeed be invalid.”). 
 94. Principal Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees on Rehearing En Banc at 24–27, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248). 
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Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar cited Ruschig for this position95 and held that 
there was a distinct written description requirement that must convey 
that, as of the filing date, the inventor was “in possession” of the 
invention.96 Nevertheless, the court applied this separate requirement 
only to later-filed claims that sought the benefit of the priority date of 
an earlier-filed specification.97 Therefore, the court was using this 
judicially recognized written description requirement as an 
alternative to a new matter rejection98 and not to determine the 
adequacy of the disclosure for original claims.99  
As this statutory interpretation did not create any new, substantive 
limitations but instead applied existing new matter requirements, the 
validity of the Ruschig and Vas-Cath interpretations was not of 
critical concern. In Lilly, however, the Federal Circuit, for the first 
time, invalidated an original claim for lack of written description, 
thereby recognizing a new substantive requirement.100 For that 
reason, the issue of whether the statute can be correctly read to 
contain a separate written description requirement has become 
critically important. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that “[t]he specification shall contain a 
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he severability of [the] 
‘written description’ provision from its enablement (‘make and use’) provision was recognized . . . as 
early as In re Ruschig.”). 
 96. Id. at 1563–64 (“[W]e hereby reaffirm, that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a ‘written 
description of the invention’ which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. The 
purpose of the ‘written description’ requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and 
use’; the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the 
filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”). 
 97. Id. at 1560 (“[T]he ‘written description’ requirement most often comes into play where claims 
not presented in the application when filed are presented thereafter. Alternatively, patent applicants 
often seek the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed . . . application . . . for claims of a later-filed 
application.”). 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the 
invention.”); 4 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 11.04 (“An applicant may amend an application’s specification 
or drawings after the application is filed,” but may not insert into the application new matter that 
involves a departure from or an addition to the original disclosure). 
 99. Vas-Cath Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560 (“The question raised by these situations is most often phrased 
as whether the application provides ‘adequate support’ for the claim(s) at issue; it has also been analyzed 
in terms of ‘new matter’ under 35 U.S.C. § 132.”). 
 100. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 5. 
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enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”101 
Judicial proponents of a separate written description requirement read 
the statute to require “a written description of the invention” that is 
separate from the requirement that the disclosure “enable any person 
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”102 Others, however, 
view the “written description of the invention” as the means for 
enabling the skilled artisan to make and use the invention and not as a 
separate requirement.103 The Federal Circuit recently agreed to finally 
consider this question en banc104 where it reaffirmed that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 contains a written description requirement separate from 
enablement.105  
2.  What is the Difference? 
Whether the statute supports a separate, substantive written 
description requirement is an important question because the 
requirement set forth in Lilly and reaffirmed in Ariad creates a 
heightened disclosure standard that is more difficult to apply than 
enablement without providing the public additional quid pro quo 
benefits.106  
                                                                                                                 
 101. 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
 102. E.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., 
concurring with denial of rehearing en banc) (“The statute states that the invention must be 
described . . . . [W]hen the statute began requiring claims, it was not amended to delete the requirement; 
note the comma between the description requirement and the enablement provision, and the ‘and’ that 
follows the comma.”); see 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
 103. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The sufficiency of [the] written description 
[requirement] . . . depends solely on whether it enables any person skilled in the art to which the 
invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention . . . .”); Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo, 323 F.3d at 988 (Linn, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (“35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a written description of the invention, but the 
measure of the sufficiency of that written description . . . should depend solely on whether it enables any 
person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention.”). 
 104. The Federal Circuit granted en banc rehearing to reconsider the severability, scope, and purpose 
of the written description requirement. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). The parties were requested to file new briefs addressing (1) “[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
paragraph 1, contains a written description requirement separate from an enablement requirement” and 
(2) if so, “what is the scope and purpose of the requirement.” Id. 
 105. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 106. Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” 
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 69 (2000) 
 
15
Giles: How to Claim a Gene: Application of the Patent Disclosure Require
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
710
Critics have viewed the Lilly written description requirement as a 
“super enablement” standard for biotechnology inventions because it 
requires a description of the invention beyond that which is required 
to enable the skilled artisan to make and use the invention.107 For 
example, citing Fiers v. Revel, the Lilly court stated that an adequate 
written description of a DNA “requires a precise definition, such as 
by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties.”108 
Importantly, this bright line rule increases the disclosure 
requirements for DNA sequences without taking into account the 
quantity or quality of the experimentation necessary to obtain the 
sequences.109 In contrast, such a disclosure could be sufficient to 
enable the invention if undue experimentation would not be 
required.110  
For enablement, the finder of fact weighs several objective factors, 
such as the predictability of the art and the relative skill of those in 
the art, to determine whether practicing the claimed invention at the 
time the application was filed would have required undue 
experimentation.111 In contrast, to determine whether the written 
description requirement was met, the finder of fact must determine 
whether the inventor was in possession of the invention at the time 
the application was filed based entirely on the patent specification 
and knowledge in the art.112  
                                                                                                                 
(“Proponents of the written description requirement have yet to explain exactly what benefits the 
requirement provides that are not already provided by the enablement requirement.”). 
 107. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Rader, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
only way to distinguish the Lilly rule from enablement is to construe Lilly as requiring more disclosure 
than necessary to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention, a ‘super-enablement’ 
standard. Interpreting Lilly in those terms, however, presents severe consequences for biotechnology.”); 
Mueller, supra note 44, at 617 (“The Lilly court’s elevation of written description to an effective ‘super 
enablement’ standard of uncertain scope and applicability will likely chill development in this critically 
important technology field and frustrate the . . . patent system’s policy goal of encouraging prompt 
disclosure of new inventions.”). 
 108. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiers 
v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.Cir.1993)). 
 109. See id.  
 110. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc., 
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed Cir. 1986); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 111. See, e.g., Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
 112. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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For example, if a DNA sequence was already known in the art, 
such evidence would be applicable to the sufficiency of both written 
description and enablement. However, in evaluating the written 
description, the finder of fact would have to ignore evidence that the 
skilled artisan could have determined the sequence of additional 
DNA variants using routine methods. Thus, even if every single 
variant covered by the claim could be sequenced and tested for 
function in a single week using routine skill, the written description 
requirement might not be satisfied. It is for these reasons that the 
Lilly possession test is viewed as representing a heightened disclosure 
standard requiring “far more specific disclosure than enablement.”113 
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit rejected the characterization that 
the Lilly written description requirement is a “super enablement” 
standard.114 Moreover, according to the Federal Circuit, the written 
description requirement is part of the quid pro quo of a patent in that 
it “allows the [Patent Office] to examine applications effectively; 
courts to understand the invention, determine compliance with the 
statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and 
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of 
the patentee’s exclusive rights.”115  
Application of the written description requirement also has 
procedural disadvantages. Importantly, whereas post-filing 
publications may be used to show that the specification was enabling 
in view of the state of the art at the time the application was filed,116 
the court will not consider post-filing evidence when determining 
adequacy of the written description.117 In other words, an inventor 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 981–82 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 114. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (arguing that the 
court has always expressly permitted the disclosure of structural features common to members of the 
genus (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
 115. Id. at 1345. 
 116. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(allowing evidence of post-filing publications that demonstrated the extent of the enabling disclosure). 
But see Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (indicating that 
courts do not have to give post-filing evidence much weight). 
 117. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355 (“Because written description is determined as of the filing date . . . 
evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art knew [after the application was filed] cannot provide 
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can use data gathered after the application was filed—demonstrating 
that the invention works as claimed—to prove that his patent was 
enabling. He cannot, however, use that same evidence to show he 
was also in possession of the invention when the application was 
filed.  
3.  Can the Lilly Written Description Requirement be Satisfied for 
Generic DNA Claims? 
An important issue to consider is whether the written description 
requirement can ever be satisfied when applied to generic DNA 
claims.118 According to the court in Enzo, functional limitations can 
satisfy the written description requirement for claims to genetic 
sequences if they are “coupled with a known or disclosed correlation 
between function and structure.”119 This position is based on the 
presumption that the more that is known about the structure of a 
protein, the greater the ability to predict genetic variants that will 
retain function.120 Nevertheless, no matter how much is known about 
a protein’s structure, it is generally impossible to predict with 
certainty the effect of a change in protein sequence—and thus 
structure—on protein function.121 
Since some amino acid residues within a protein are directly 
involved in the activity of the protein, it is predictable that 
substitution of these residues, especially non-conservative 
substitutions,122 might affect protein function.123 On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                 
substantial evidence to the jury that the asserted claims were supported by adequate written 
description.”). 
 118. See discussion supra note 14. 
 119. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the standard 
described in the Written Description Guidelines for showing that an invention is complete). 
 120. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 42 (“[A]mino acid substitutions outside of the 
two identified functional domains are unlikely to greatly affect activity Y.”). 
 121. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Christopher M. Holman in Support of Neither Party at 
14–15, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248) 
(“[D]espite recent advances in the field . . . protein engineering remains as much an art as it is a 
science . . . because the rules defining sequence-structure-function relationships are still not well 
understood.” (second and third alteration in original) (quoting PROTEIN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN vii 
(Sheldon J. Park & Jennifer R. Cochran eds., CRC Press 2010))). 
 122. A conservative substitution is “the replacement in a protein of one amino acid by another, 
chemically similar, amino acid . . . [which] is generally expected to lead to either no change or only a 
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the sequence of a protein also determines how the amino acid 
polymer folds into secondary and tertiary shapes, which in turn 
affects the activity and stability of the protein.124 Therefore, 
substitution of amino acid residues within the polymer can affect the 
structure, and thus the activity or stability of the protein.125 While 
experimental three-dimensional (3D) structures predicted from 
crystallography studies greatly improve the ability to correlate protein 
function and stability, these predicted structures are available for only 
a small percentage of proteins.126 Moreover, efforts to predict protein 
function based on changes in protein stability have so far failed to 
provide a simple correlation between protein stability and function.127 
In light of this uncertainly, a rational application of Lilly’s written 
description requirement to genetic sequences may require that the 
specification provide evidence that each and every sequence covered 
under the claim be functional. If invention requires actual possession 
by the inventor, rather than merely placing the public in possession of 
the invention without undue experimentation, then it stands to reason 
that no claim to a DNA or protein is valid if it were not first shown to 
possess the desired function. Of course, such an application of the 
Lilly written description standard could seem unduly strict in view of 
the constitutional mandate to promote scientific progress,128 which 
may be why the Enzo court attempted to reduce the impact of the 
written description requirement. 
Interestingly, the Enzo court relaxed the written description 
requirement based on evidence that deposit of genetic sequences in a 
public depository “makes its contents accessible to the public when it 
is not otherwise available in written form.”129 Admittedly, “[t]he 
practice of depositing biological material arose primarily to satisfy 
                                                                                                                 
small change in the properties of the protein.” DICTIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 97 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 1989).  
 123. Yana Bromberg & Burkhard Rost, Correlating Protein Function and Stability Through the 
Analysis of Single Amino Acid Substitutions, 10 (Supp. 8) BMC BIOINFORMATICS, S8 (2009). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 129. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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the enablement requirement,” but the court extended this application 
to written description even though the inventors did not know the 
structure of the sequences.130 The court made this concession because 
“[a] person of skill in the art, reading the accession numbers in the 
patent specification, can obtain the claimed sequences from the . . . 
depository by following the appropriate techniques to excise the 
nucleotide sequences from the deposited organisms containing those 
sequences.”131 Thus, while the deposit enabled the skilled artisan to 
determine the structure of the genetic sequences without undue 
experimentation, it did nothing to show that the inventors were 
actually in possession of this structure when the application was 
filed.132 The court nevertheless concluded that the written description 
was satisfied.133 
The court continued to apply enablement standards to relax the 
written description requirement in Noelle v. Lederman, holding that 
inventors can show possession of an antibody by disclosing the 
antigen to which the antibody binds.134 The court came to this 
conclusion based on the “well defined structural characteristics for 
the five classes of antibody, the functional characteristics of antibody 
binding, and the fact that the antibody technology is well developed 
and mature.”135  
The rulings in Enzo and Noelle have been correctly criticized as a 
clear departure from the Lilly standard of requiring sufficient 
structural disclosure of the claimed invention.136 More importantly, 
these cases blur the distinction between these supposedly divergent 
requirements by applying enablement standards in Lilly clothing.  
This blurring continued in the Ariad en banc decision, where the 
court identified a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of 
disclosure for generic claims that are surprisingly similar to the In re 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 965–66. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id.  
 133. Id. at 966. 
 134. Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 135. Id. (quoting Enzo, 323 F.3d at 964). 
 136. Wenrong Huang, Enzo’s Written Description Requirement: Can It Be an Effective Check Against 
Overly Broad Biotechnology Claims?, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 13–14 (2006). 
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Wands factors used to evaluate enablement.137 In identifying these 
factors, the court was recognizing that “the level of detail required to 
satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the 
nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and 
predictability of the relevant technology.”138 Therefore, the amount of 
detail needed to satisfy the written description requirement will 
depend upon similar factors to that of the enablement requirement, 
albeit with different goals in mind. 
4.  Does the Lilly Written Description Requirement Protect the 
Public? 
Many commentators have defended the substantive written 
description requirement set forth in Lilly based on public policy 
reasons.139 These commentators appear to be reacting to a fear that a 
select few will gain a monopoly over all of the valuable genes and 
thereby hinder research and development.140 The economics of how 
patent scope affects the progress of science, however, is actually 
quite complicated.141 Courts, therefore, have used the disclosure 
requirements to ensure that the scope of patent claims at least do not 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“For generic 
claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of disclosure, including ‘the 
existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the 
science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); cf. supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Huang, supra note 136, at 14 (arguing that the written description requirement prevents the 
granting of monopolies to inventors for something they did not invent); William C. Mull, Using the 
Written Description Requirement to Limit Broad Patent Scope, Allow Competition, and Encourage 
Innovation in Biotechnology, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 393, 421 (2004) (arguing that without Lilly, “an 
applicant would be able to claim more than he invented simply by including the claims in the original 
application”); Zhibin Ren, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description Requirement 
and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1321 (1999) 
(arguing that had the inventors in Lilly wanted to claim cDNA from other species, they could have 
cloned and sequenced them); Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 
537, 562–63 (1999) (arguing that upholding the claims would have rendered the species obvious, 
effectively blocking others from obtaining patents on those molecules, which would have crippled the 
biotechnology industry). 
 140. See supra note 136. 
 141. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 904–09 (1990); Mull, supra note 139, at 426–30. 
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reach beyond the quid pro quo provided by the disclosure in 
exchange for the government granted monopoly.142  
Prior to Lilly, adequacy of disclosure in satisfying the quid pro quo 
was evaluated in terms of enablement,143 which requires that the 
inventor enable the full scope of the invention and thereby place the 
invention into the public’s possession without undue 
experimentation.144 In contrast, the written description requirement 
demands that disclosure demonstrate that the inventor was in 
possession of the invention at the time the application was filed.145  
While there may be economic theories to support limiting the 
scope of biotechnology patent claims to less than what was 
enabled,146 these theories are not based on the traditional quid pro 
quo concern.147 Instead, the Lilly court defended this strict application 
of the disclosure requirement on the grounds that the description must 
further demonstrate to the skilled artisan that the inventor “invented” 
what is claimed.148  
To understand how this “invention” standard benefits the public, it 
is necessary to consider the context of the cases in which it was first 
enumerated. Prior to Lilly, the written description requirement was 
used to prevent applicants from amending their applications to claim 
aspects of their invention that they had not originally described in the 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[D]escription [of 
the invention] is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful disclosure in 
exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”); 3 CHISUM, 
supra note 17, § 7.01. 
 143. E.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 
18, at 6–8.  
 144. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Although not explicitly stated in section 
112, to be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use 
the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”). 
 145. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 146. See Mull, supra note 139, at 426–30; Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 904–09. 
 147. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (U.S. 1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated 
by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public 
from an invention with substantial utility.”). 
 148. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To fulfill the 
written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient 
detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’” 
(citing Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
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patent specification or original claims.149 In that context, the court 
determined that it is not enough that a disclosure enable or make 
obvious the later-claimed invention; it must also disclose the 
invention sufficiently to support the conclusion that the inventor had 
actually invented it at the time the disclosure was filed.150 For 
example, if someone invents a doorknob and describes how to make 
the doorknob out of wood, he would not be allowed a year later to 
amend his application to recite that the doorknob could be made of 
porcelain, even though a porcelain doorknob would be enabled and 
considered obvious in view of his patented wooden doorknob.151  
Therefore, this use of written description to police priority and new 
matter amendments serves a purpose distinct from the quid pro quo 
requirement of enablement—it prevents an applicant from claiming 
improvements and specific embodiments she had not contemplated 
when the application was filed. Importantly, this view does not 
prevent an inventor from claiming a genus that covers multiple 
embodiments if she has enabled the full scope of the genus; it does, 
however, prevent her from later claiming a specific embodiment 
covered by her genus claim that is merely obvious in view of her 
disclosure of the genus.152 
B.  Claiming Genes that Do Not Work 
Since it is possible that written description can be secured for 
sequence identity claims by excluding a functional limitation from 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See, e.g., Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72 (considering whether claims should receive the benefit 
of an earlier filed application where the invention would have been obvious in view of the disclosure of 
the prior application); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the 
written description requirement is relevant to new claims not present in the application or in claims 
seeking the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed application); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 991 
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (considering the validity of a claim added to the application a year after it was filed to a 
specific drug that was not disclosed in the specification). 
 150. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995 (“While we have no doubt a person so motivated would be enabled by 
the specification to make [the claimed compound], this is beside the point for the question is not whether 
he would be so enabled but whether the specification discloses the compound to him, specifically, as 
something appellants actually invented.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). 
 152. A genus does not always anticipate or make obvious a species of that genus. Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash., 334 F.3d 1264, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 1 CHISUM, supra note 17, 
§ 3.02(2)(c). 
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the claim,153 it is important to consider the impact of this claim 
strategy on enablement.  
Notably, the Board has shown a willingness to find enablement of 
sequence identity claims when the functional limitation is 
included.154 For example, the claims in Ex parte Kubin contained a 
functional limitation, which limited the scope of the percent identity 
claim to operable embodiments.155 The Board found that the percent 
identity claims limited by a functional limitation lacked sufficient 
written description.156 The court also concluded, however, that even 
though the amount of experimentation needed to practice the full 
scope of the invention might have been extensive, it would have been 
routine based, inter alia, on the state of the art and the relative skill of 
those in the art.157 The Board based this opinion on evidence that 
methods of making the claimed nucleic acid sequences and screening 
for activity were known in the art and described in the 
specification.158  
Therefore, for claims to a genus of genetic sequences reciting a 
function for the proteins encoded by the sequences, the enablement 
inquiry is whether the skilled artisan can make genetic sequences 
within the structural scope of the claim and screen them for the 
claimed function without undue experimentation.159 
Since the purpose of the functional limitation is to expressly limit 
the scope of the claimed sequences to those that are functional and to 
thereby exclude inoperative embodiments, it is important to consider 
the impact of omitting the function from the claims on the 
enablement inquiry. A claim to a genus can be enabled even when it 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Compare Claim 1 with Claim 2 in Example 11A of REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 
26, at 37. 
 154. See, e.g., Ex parte Abad, 2008 WL 904456, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 2008); Ex parte Kubin, 83 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 155. Claim 73 recited: “An isolated nucleic acid molecule comprising a polynucleotide encoding a 
polypeptide at least 80% identical to amino acids 22–221 of SEQ ID NO:2, wherein the polypeptide 
binds CD48.” Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1412 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 156. Id. at 1416–17 (“While we conclude one skilled in the art would have been able to make and use 
the full scope of [the invention] through routine experimentation, we find Appellants did not describe 
the invention . . . sufficiently to show they had possession of the claimed genus of nucleic acids.”). 
 157. Id. at 1416. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
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covers some inoperative embodiments.160 If, however, the number of 
inoperative embodiments is so high that it forces the skilled artisan to 
use undue experimentation to identify functional embodiments and 
practice the invention, the claim will fail for lack of enablement.161 
Therefore, for claims to a genus of genetic sequences that do not 
recite a function for the sequence, the enablement inquiry is whether 
the skilled artisan can make nucleic acids within the structural scope 
of the claim and screen them for a function identified in the 
specification without undue experimentation. Sound familiar? The 
only apparent difference in the two enablement inquiries is that in the 
first instance, the function is recited in the claim, and in the second 
instance, a function is provided in the specification.162  
Certainly, a difference in scope exists between these two types of 
genus claims. A claim to a genus of genetic sequences that does not 
recite a function most likely reads on inoperative embodiments such 
that the inventor can exclude others from making and using genetic 
sequences that do not have a use disclosed in the patent application. 
For example, a claim to a genus of proteins having 95% sequence 
identity to insulin will inevitably cover many protein variants that 
would not be effective in treating diabetes.163 Moreover, were one to 
later identify another novel use for one or more of those inoperative 
insulin variants, such as the ability to repair cartilage,164 the genus 
claim would still dominate that later invention even though the 
inventor had not enabled a use for that insulin variant.  
                                                                                                                 
 160. In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (arguing that there is nothing wrong with claims 
reading on vast numbers of inoperative embodiments so long as the skilled artisan could determine 
utility without unreasonable effort). 
 161. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“Of course, if the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one of 
ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might 
indeed be invalid.”). 
 162. The specification must provide a specific and substantial utility for the claimed invention. In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing that the claimed invention must provide a well-
defined and particular benefit to the public as disclosed in its current form); Brenner v. Manson, 383 
U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for 
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial 
utility.”). 
 163. See Holman, Protein Similarity Score, supra note 10, at 72 n.70. 
 164. See Use of Insulin for the Treatment of Cartilagenous Disorders, U.S. Patent No. 6,689,747 (filed 
Mar. 22, 2001). 
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III.  PROPOSAL 
Inventors should consider claiming genetic inventions based on 
sequence identity without reciting a function for the genetic variants 
in the claim. While this approach will result in claims covering 
genetic sequences that do not function according to the invention—
inoperative embodiments—the burden on the skilled artisan to 
practice the invention with this approach is no more onerous than 
when the function is recited.165 The fact that inclusion of the 
functional limitation can cause otherwise patentable claims to 
become invalid is a testament to the problems inherent with severing 
enablement and written description standards. 
A.  Enablement is Enough 
The Lilly written description requirement demands more than 
placing the public in possession of the invention—it requires that the 
disclosure demonstrate the inventor was in actual possession of the 
invention at the time the application was filed.166 This additional 
check on the patent system is based on the premise that inventors 
should not be granted patents for things they did not invent;167 an 
appealing proposition, on its face. Nevertheless, the public is equally 
enriched either way since the enablement standard requires that the 
public gain possession of the invention without undue 
experimentation.  
Consider the following hypothetical. Andy discovers gold using 
his gold detector. He is able to prove that there is at least one ounce 
of gold buried in the ground, but only additional digging will 
determine the full scope of the treasure. He subsequently makes a 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 166. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 167. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., 
concurring) (“The description of the invention . . . sets forth what has been invented, and sets boundaries 
of what can be claimed. . . . The dissent’s citation of cases . . . reinforces . . . the role of the description 
of the invention in establishing what has been invented.”). 
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contract168 with Bob to split the treasure if Bob does the digging. Bob 
digs three feet down, as instructed, and finds a 100-ounce nugget of 
gold. Should it matter whether Andy knew the exact amount of gold 
beforehand? Bob is equally enriched regardless of whether Andy had 
foreknowledge of the full scope of the treasure. Moreover, were we 
to require more initial disclosure by Andy in order for him to enforce 
his claim, he would be less inclined to contract with other prospectors 
at the point when he first discovered the source of gold. 
The proponents of the Lilly written description requirement would 
presumably want Andy to forfeit his claim to his share of the 
remaining ninety-nine ounces of gold since he only disclosed one 
ounce. Applying these proponents’ public policy arguments, Andy 
should not be able to claim the full scope of the treasure until he was 
in “possession” of his discovery, i.e., until Andy could describe it 
with structural detail.169 It would not satisfy them that Andy enabled 
Bob to gain possession of the gold by identifying the location of the 
gold and giving Bob a shovel.170 Rather, to protect his secret, Andy 
should have determined how much gold was present before he started 
handing out shovels.171  
Of course, Lilly proponents claim they are protecting the public by 
preventing prospectors from laying claim to all the treasure in the 
ground prematurely.172 This concern, however, is unfounded, since 
the claim has to place the public in possession of the full scope of the 
treasure being claimed without undue experimentation.173 For 
                                                                                                                 
 168. A patent can be viewed as a contract between the inventor and the public. Pickering v. Holman, 
459 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972) (“A patent is in the nature of a contract between the public and the 
inventor . . . . The publication bar goes upon the theory that the idea is already in the public domain and 
there can be no consideration offered in exchange for the grant of the monopoly.”). 
 169. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An 
adequate written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, 
chemical name, or physical properties’ . . . .” (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
1993))). 
 170. See Ren, supra note 139, at 1321 (arguing that had the inventors in Lilly wanted to claim cDNA 
from other species, they could have cloned and sequenced them). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Huang, supra note 139, at 14 (arguing that the written description requirement prevents the 
granting of monopolies to inventors for something they did not invent); Mull, supra note 139, at 421 
(arguing that without Lilly, an applicant would be able to claim more than he invented simply by 
including the claims in the original application). 
 173. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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example, Andy would have a much harder time justifying his claim 
had he merely told Bob that there was a precious metal somewhere 
underground within a specified square mile and had only given Bob a 
spoon to dig with.  
Likewise, the role of the written description requirement 
recognized in Ruschig and Vas-Cath provides a distinct role in 
protecting the public. For example, if Bob is rewarded for his digging 
efforts by finding diamonds in addition to gold, Andy would not be 
heard to say he had a claim to the diamonds as well.174 Why can he 
claim the additional amounts of gold but not the diamonds? A simple 
answer is that he did not assert a credible claim to diamonds when 
handing out the shovels.175 Someone specifically looking for 
diamonds would not have been any closer to finding them based on 
Andy’s claim. Moreover, had Andy tried to claim diamonds when he 
only had evidence of gold, his claim would likely not have been 
considered credible.176 Thus, the enablement standard is sufficient to 
satisfy the quid pro quo disclosure requirement; whereas the written 
description standard judicially recognized in Ruschig serves a limited 
purpose in policing priority claims.177 
Unfortunately, the court did not apply the enablement standard to 
the claims rejected in Lilly.178 It is possible that in the early days of 
biotechnology, finding homologous cDNAs in other mammalian 
species was more akin to using a spoon than a shovel to dig for 
treasure, and that the claims in those early cases were properly 
rejected.179 Since then, however, cloning and sequencing methods 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. 
 175. The claims define “the invention for the purpose of applying the conditions of patentability” 
determining infringement. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 8.01. 
 176. See Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing 
that plausibility of invention is not enough and that some data supporting the claimed invention is 
necessary to enable an invention). 
 177. See discussion supra Part II.A.4.  
 178. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 179. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 980, n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., 
dissenting) (“In 1977, biotechnology was still in its infancy. In fact, the Maxam and Gilbert method of 
sequencing DNA was just published in 1977. Cloning in that era was, at a minimum, unpredictable and 
would have required vast amounts of experimentation to accomplish. Therefore, the patent’s prophetic 
disclosure of human insulin cDNA hardly enabled its production as claimed. Instead of pursuing this 
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have become more conventional.180 Therefore, the court should 
ascertain the level of experimentation required for the public to gain 
possession of the full scope of the invention since the inventor’s 
possession at the time the application was filed does little for the 
public.  
B.  Function Recited or Implied 
In view of the Written Description Training Materials published by 
the Patent Office181 and the application of this view by the Board,182 
genetic sequences should be claimed based on percent identity to a 
reference sequence without reciting the function of the genetic 
sequence in the claim. Without the functional limitation, a genus of 
genetic sequence based on sequence identity is defined entirely by 
structure, which is alone sufficient to describe the invention.183 The 
only problem with this approach is that the genus is likely to cover 
inoperative embodiments based on the substitution of amino acid 
residues critical for protein function or stability.184  
However, the amount of experimentation necessary to avoid 
inoperative embodiments covered by the claim when function is 
omitted should be the same as the amount of experimentation 
necessary to identify sequences that have the functional limitation 
recited in the claim.185 For example, if Andy’s gold mine contains 
both gold and pyrite,186 the amount of experimentation needed for 
Bob to separate the gold from the pyrite is the same no matter how it 
was claimed. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that sequence 
                                                                                                                 
obvious avenue of rejection, the Federal Circuit reached out beyond the statute and the case law to create 
a new general disclosure test.”).  
 180. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 181. See REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 37–42. 
 182. See Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416–17 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 183. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (“An adequate written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise 
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties’ . . . .” (quoting Fiers v. 
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.Cir.1993))). 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 185. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 186. Interestingly, while the mineral pyrite is nicknamed “fool’s gold” due to its resemblance to gold, 
iron pyrite has been found to have other—inventive—uses. See, e.g., Katherine Bourzac, Mining Fool’s 
Gold for Solar: Cyrus Wadia is Using Abundant Materials to Grow Nanocrystals for Cheaper 
Photovaltaics, 112 TECH. REV. 80 (Nov. 1, 2009); U.S. Patent No. 4,119,769 (filed Oct. 31, 1977). 
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identity claims that do not recite a functional limitation can likewise 
be enabled.  
Importantly, the Board has been willing to find sequence identity 
claims enabled when the genus of sequences are further limited to 
those having a particular function.187 This willingness is based on the 
understanding that undue experimentation is not required when 
methods of making nucleic acid sequences covered by the claim and 
methods of screening for those sequences having the desired activity 
are sufficiently known in the art and described in the specification.188  
C.  Experimentation in the Genetic Age 
The primary issue with sequence identity claims is that the number 
of possible variants covered by the claim can be enormous.189 Even 
allowing for a single amino acid change can result in millions of 
possible genetic sequences covered by a claim.190 While it may be 
reasonable for the skilled artisan to make a few genetic variants 
covered by the claim and screen them for the desired function, it may 
not be reasonable to ask that same person to test several thousand 
variants. On the other hand, what was unreasonable yesterday may be 
reasonable tomorrow due to technological improvements and 
automation. That is why the court considers several factors in 
determining whether a disclosure would require undue 
experimentation.191 In In re Wands, the court set forth several factors 
to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require 
undue experimentation, including the amount of guidance in the 
patent application, the state of the art, the relative skill of those in the 
art, the predictability of the invention, and the breadth of the 
claims.192  
                                                                                                                 
 187. See, e.g., Ex parte Abad, 2008 WL 904456, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 2008); Ex parte Kubin, 83 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1416. 
 188. Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1416. 
 189. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 190. See id. 
 191. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 
(B.P.A.I. 1986)). 
 192. Id. 
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Currently, even with the advancements made in the field of in 
silico protein structure prediction, it is still generally impossible to 
predict with certainty the effect that a change in protein sequence, 
and thus structure, will have on protein function.193 Therefore, 
whether a sequence identity claim is enabled will depend inter alia 
upon the level of identity claimed, which determines the breadth of 
the claim, and the nature of the assay for testing for activity.194 For 
example, if a high-throughput assay can be used to test for function 
of the genetic variants, a lower percent identity—a larger genus and 
thus more non-functional variants—can be tolerated without undue 
experimentation.195 In contrast, a higher percent identity—a smaller 
genus—would be necessary where the invention requires in vivo 
testing to determine whether a genetic variant has the desired 
activity.196 
CONCLUSION 
It is reasonable for inventors of novel genes and recombinant 
technologies to desire patent protection beyond the scope of the 
specific genetic sequence they exemplify.197 Notably, it is becoming 
increasingly simple for a competitor to engineer genetic variants that 
preserve, or in some cases improve, the therapeutic efficacy of an 
encoded protein in order to circumvent a patent.198 In contrast, while 
simple to identify one variant, the number of such functional variants 
is potentially so enormous that it is impractical—if not impossible—
for the inventor to recite each and every one.199 Nevertheless, 
reasonable efforts by inventors to define genetic inventions in a 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 194. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 198. Holman, Learning from Litigation, supra note 8, at 226–27; Holman, Protein Similarity Score, 
supra note 10, at 57–60. 
 199. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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manner that will prevent routine circumvention are being viewed as 
overreaching.200 
The patent disclosure requirements codified in the first paragraph 
of 35 U.S.C. § 112201 are intended to prevent overreaching by 
inventors beyond the quid pro quo the public receives for granting the 
limited monopoly.202 Prior to 1997, the courts relied primarily on the 
enablement requirement to invalidate overreaching claims.203 
However, in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,204 the court for the first time invalidated an original, arguably 
overreaching, claim for lack of written description.205 In doing so, the 
court stated that an adequate written description of a DNA “requires a 
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or 
physical properties.”206 This bright line rule creates a heightened 
disclosure standard that is more difficult to apply than enablement 
without providing to the public additional quid pro quo benefits.207 
Notably, the court has attempted to relax the stringency of this 
requirement.208 These efforts have, however, involved application of 
enablement principles to show possession by the inventor.209 This 
blurring of the distinction between these supposedly divergent 
requirements begs the question whether enablement and written 
description are properly severable in the first place.210 
One approach originally endorsed by the Patent Office211 to satisfy 
the Lilly written description requirement for genetic inventions was 
the claiming a genus of genetic sequences based on percent identity 
to a reference sequence that is limited by a functional limitation.212 
According to the court in Enzo, however, in order for functional 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 201. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  
 202. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 7.01. 
 203. See discussion supra Part I; supra note 18. 
 204. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 205. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 4. 
 206. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 207. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 208. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 209. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.  
 210. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 211. See supra note 23. 
 212. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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limitations to satisfy the written description requirement, they must 
be “coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function 
and structure.”213 Consistent with this decision, the Patent Office 
recently reversed its position and proposed that inclusion of a 
functional limitation, which narrows the genus of genetic sequences 
to those that produce a functional protein, actually increases the 
burden on the specification to satisfy the written description 
requirement by disclosing a correlation between structure and 
function.214 This position is based on the presumption that the more 
you know about the structure of a protein, the greater the ability to 
predict genetic variants that will retain function.215 This, however, 
may not be true since no matter how much is known about a protein’s 
structure, it is generally impossible to predict with certainty the effect 
of a change in protein sequence, and thus structure, on protein 
function.216  
Inventors should therefore consider defining genetic inventions 
completely by structure without reciting the function in the claims. 
While this approach will result in claims covering genetic sequences 
that do not function according to the invention—inoperative 
embodiments—the burden on the skilled artisan to practice the 
invention with this approach is no more onerous than when the 
function is recited.217 That is because the amount of experimentation 
for the skilled artisan to avoid inoperative embodiments—when the 
function is omitted—is identical to the amount of experimentation 
necessary to identify functional variants when function is recited in 
the claim.218 Either way, the skilled artisan must make variants 
defined structurally by the claim and then use an assay to test the 
variants for the desired function. The fact that the written description 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc, 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the standard 
described in the Written Description Guidelines for showing that an invention is complete). 
 214. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 37–39. 
 215. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 42 (“[A]mino acid substitutions outside of the 
two identified functional domains are unlikely to greatly affect activity Y.”). 
 216. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 217. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 218. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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standard treats these two situations so differently is another testament 
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